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Comments I
Pakistan's General Pervez Musharraf:
Deceitful Dictator or Father of Democracy?
Terence N. Cushing*
"I'm a soldier, frankly, I believe in destiny, and I'm not afraid.",
Pakistani President General Pervez Musharraf
1. Introduction
In October 1999, General Pervez Musharraf assumed the title of
Chief Executive of Pakistan after a bloodless military takeover.2 After
the coup, General Musharraf suspended the Pakistani Constitution,
dissolved Parliament, and appointed an eight-member National Security
Council as the premier governing body.3 This comment provides an in-
depth analysis of the legal and political ramifications of General Pervez
J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of The Pennsylvania State
University, 2003.
1. CNN, Transcript of CNN Interview with Musharraf at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/0 1/musharraf.transcript/index.html
(last visited Apr. 20, 2003) [hereinafter "Transcript ofInterview'].
2. Central Intelligence Agency, The CIA World Factbook - Pakistan, at
http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/pk.html (last visited Oct. 26,
2001)[hereinafter "Central Intelligence Agency"]. See also Sean D. Murphy, U.S.
Reaction to Military Coup in Pakistan, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 354 (2000).
3. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
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Musharraf's rise to power and his subsequent suspension of the
Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Further, this comment
examines the repercussions of these events, with the focus being on the
legal consequences of these sudden changes, and whether the General's
reign has served to improve, or hinder, Pakistan's promised march
toward democracy.
Pakistan has been thrust into the global spotlight as a result of the
terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001. The United
States asked General Musharraf to play a key role in America's fledgling
war against terrorism. Yet, as a bordering state of Afghanistan, and with
a population of 145 million, ninety-seven percent of which are Muslim,
Pakistan found itself in the unenviable position of having to choose
whether to continue to ally itself with the Taliban, its turbulent, staunchly
Islamic neighbor, or to cooperate with the influential United States in its
steadfast determination to extinguish terrorism. 4 To avert a potential
civil war, General Musharraf must massage the fears of Pakistan's
overwhelmingly Muslim population, many of who remain loyal to
extremist Muslim groups such as the Taliban.
This comment examines how the recent terrorist events in the
United States have affected, and may affect, Pakistan, considering its
current status as a state without an operating Constitution. Additionally,
this comment will explore how the ongoing hunt for Osama bin Laden
has dictated, and will continue to dictate, many of Musharraf's political
and military decisions.
II. Musharraf's Coup d'Etat and Its Constitutionality
Determined not to submit to then Prime Minister Nawaz Sharifs
plan to fire him as the leader of Pakistan's military, General Pervez
Musharraf returned from his army visit to Sri Lanka on October 12,
1999, and in a bloodless coup, immediately ordered the Pakistani
military to arrest Sharif.5 However, the General's return was not without
near catastrophe. Suspicious of the General's motives, Sharif refused to
allow Musharraf's plane, carrying 198 passengers, to land.6 Finally, the
jet did touch down, at Musharraf's insistence, with only seven minutes
worth of fuel remaining.7 The General averted disaster and commenced
4. See Insight on the News, Pakistan's Leader Vows to Establish Democracy, at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/m 571 / 16_17/74337137/p 1/article.jhtml?term-musharr
af+and+de+borchgrave (April 30, 2001).
5. See Murphy, supra note 2.
6. Id.
7. CNN, Pakistan: Sharif's Family Says Verdict a 'Vendetta,' at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/south/04/07/pakistan.sharif.reax/index.html (Dec.
10, 2000) [hereinafter "Verdict'].
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what was to be a highly watched and embattled leadership of precarious
Pakistan. The coup was the fourth overthrow in Pakistan's short history.8
To begin with, Musharraf alleged that Prime Minister Sharif,
elected by receiving two-thirds of the vote, had engaged in a number of
unsavory tactics, which led to Musharraf's hostile, yet civilized,
takeover.9 In addition to his attempt to prevent a planeload of passengers
from safely landing, Sharif's administration accrued allegations of
corruption and incited controversy when Sharif dismissed the Supreme
Court's Chief Justice.' For his role in the incident concerning
Musharraf s jet, Sharif earned two life sentences." Convicted of both
hijacking and terrorism, 2 Shariff avoided imprisonment and remains in
Saudi Arabia where he is satisfying a ten-year exile imposed by
Musharraf.13 With alacrity, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and
suspended the Pakistani Constitution ("Constitution") 4 and issued a
Proclamation of Emergency of October 14, 1999, in which he boldly
announced: "[T]he whole of Pakistan will come under the control of the
Armed Forces of Pakistan."'
' 5
8. Murphy, supra note 2.
9. See Verdict, supra note 7.
10. Id.
11. See Verdict, supra note 7.
12. CNN, Pakistani High Court Upholds Military Coup, at
http://www.cnn.com/2000/ASIANOW/south/05/12/pakistan.sharif.02/index.html (May
13, 2000)[hereinafter "High Court"].
13. See Anthony Spaeth, Dangerous Ground: Can Pakistan's Dictator Pervez
Musharraf A Battle-Tested Soldier, Survive the Political Minefield that Lies Before
Him?, TIME MAGAZINE (Nov. 1, 2002), at
http://www.time.com/time/asia/covers/ 1101 020722/story.html See also CNN, Musharraf
Bars Predecessors from PM Role, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/07/musharraf.prn/index.html (July
7, 2002).
14. Murphy, supra note 2.
15. Proclamation of Emergency (1999), at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post 12oct99/proclamation-of emergenc
y_14oct1999.orig.html (last visited Nov. 25, 2001). The proclamation provides:
In pursuance of deliberations and decisions of Chiefs of Staff of the Armed
Forces and Corps Commanders of Pakistan Army, I, General Pervez
Musharraf, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee and Chief of Army Staff,
proclaim emergency throughout Pakistan and assume the office of the Chief
Executive of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.
I hereby order and proclaim as follows:
(a) The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan shall remain in
abeyance;
(b)The President of Pakistan shall continue in office;
(c) The National Assembly, the Provincial Assemblies, and Senate shall
stand suspended;
(d) The Chairman and Deputy Chairman of the Senate, the Speaker and
Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly and the Provincial Assemblies
shall stand suspended;
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Following his proclamation, Musharraf issued a Provisional
Constitutional Order ("Provisional Constitution") to replace the
suspended Constitution.1 6  The Provisional Constitution pledges that
(e) The Prime Minister, the Federal Ministers, Ministers of State, Advisors
to the Prime Minister, Parliamentary secretaries, the Provincial Governors,
the Provincial Chief Ministers, the Provincial Ministers and the Advisors
to the Chief Ministers shall cease to hold office;
(f) The whole of Pakistan will come under the control of the Armed
Forces of Pakistan.
This proclamation shall come into force at once and be deemed to have
taken effect on and 12th day of October, 1999.
Id.
16. Provisional Constitution Order No. 1 of 1999, at
http://www.pakistani.org/pakistan/constitution/post_1 2oct99/pco 1_1999.html (last visited
Nov. 25, 200 1)[hereinafter "Provisional Constitution"]. The Provisional Constitution
Order provides:
In pursuance of Proclamation of the 14th day of October, 1999, and in exercise
of all powers enabling him in that behalf, the Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff
Committee and Chief of Army Staff and Chief Executive of the Islamic
Republic of Pakistan under the Proclamation of Emergency of 14th day of
October 1999 (hereinafter referred to as the Chief Executive) is pleased to
make and promulgate the following Order:
1. (1) This Order may be called Provisional Constitution Order No.1 of
1999; (2) It extends to the whole of Pakistan; (3) It shall come into force at
once.
2. (1) Notwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution
of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, hereinafter referred to as the
Constitution, Pakistan shall, subject to this Order and any other Orders
made by the Chief Executive, be governed, as nearly as may be, in
accordance with the Constitution.
(2) Subject as aforesaid, all courts in existence immediately before the
commencement of this Order, shall continue to function and to exercise
their respective powers and jurisdiction provided that the Supreme Court
or High Courts and any other court shall not have the powers to make any
order against the Chief Executive or any person exercising powers or
jurisdiction under his authority;
(3) The Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II of the
Constitution, not in conflict with the Proclamation of Emergency or any
Order made thereunder from time to time, shall continue to be in force.
(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Proclamation of the 14 th
day of October, 1999 or this Order or any other law for the time being in
force, all provisions of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of
Pakistan embodying Islamic injunctions including Article 2, 2A, 31, 203A
to 203J, 227 to 231 and 260 (3) (a) and (b) shall continue to be in force
and no provision as aforesaid shall remain in abeyance or be deemed to
have remained in abeyance at any time.
3. (1) The President shall act on, and in accordance with the advice of the
Chief Executive;
(2) The Governor of the Province shall act on, and in accordance with the
instructions of the Chief Executive.
4. (1) No Court, Tribunal or other authority shall call or permit to be called
in question the proclamation of Emergency of 14th day of October, 1999
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Pakistan will be governed as nearly as possible in accordance with the
Constitution. 17 If nothing else, the attempt to mirror the Constitution as
closely as practical, shows Musharraf's proclivity towards a non-hostile
transition of power and bolsters the credibility of his promises to
transform a virtual dictatorship into a burgeoning democracy.
Moreover, Musharraf appointed himself Chief Executive and
created an eight-member National Security Council, which serves as
Pakistan's chief governing body.' 8
Categorized by analysts as a political moderate determined to
improve Pakistan's economy, Musharraf has promised that the intended
result of the coup is to restore civilian rule. 19 As for the Pakistani
Supreme Court ("Supreme Court"), the Provisional Constitution provides
that all courts in existence prior to the coup shall remain in existence and
continue to exercise their authority, so long as their authority does not
conflict with the supreme authority of the Chief Executive.2 °
or any Order made in pursuance thereof.
(2) No judgment, decree, writ, order or process whatsoever shall be made
or issued by any court or tribunal against the Chief Executive or any
authority designated by the Chief Executive.
5. Notwithstanding the abeyance of the provisions of the Constitution, but
subject to the Orders of the Chief Executive, all laws other than the
Constitution, all Ordinances, Orders, Rules, Bye-laws, Regulation,
Notifications and other legal instruments in force in any part of Pakistan
whether made by the President or the Governor of the Province, shall
continue in force until altered, amended or repealed by the Chief
Executive or any authority designated by him.
5A.(I)An Ordinance promulgated by the President or by the Governor of the
Province shall not be subject to the limitation as its duration prescribed in the
Constitution.
(2)The provisions of clause (1) shall also apply to an Ordinance issued by the
President or by the Governor which was in force immediately before the
commencement of the Proclamation Order of Chief Executive of the Fourteenth
day of October, 1999.
6. The Proclamation of Emergency issued on 28th day of May 1998, shall continue
but subject to the provisions of Proclamation of Emergency dated 14th day of October
1999 and this Provincial Constitution Order and any other Order made thereunder.
7. All persons who, immediately before the commencement of this Order, were in
the service of Pakistan as defined in Article 260 of the Constitution and those persons
who immediately before such commencement were in office as Judge of the Supreme
Court, the Federal Shariat Court or a High Court or Chief Election Commissioner or
Auditor-General or Ombudsman and Chief Ehtesab Commissioner, shall continue in the
said service on the same terms and conditions and shall enjoy the same privileges, if any.
Id.
17. Id.
18. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
19. CNN, General Pervez Musharraf President and Chief Executive of Pakistan, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/20/musharraf.biog/index.html (June
28, 2001).
20. Provisional Constitution, supra note 16.
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Despite this lack of enforceable authority, the Supreme Court issued
a mandate requiring Musharraf to relinquish executive and legislative
authority by October 12, 2002, the three-year anniversary of the coup.2'
The Supreme Court ruled, much to Musharraf s content, that "state
necessity" compelled Musharraf to wrestle control of the country from
Sharif and place the Constitution in abeyance. Yet, the Supreme Court
ruling only validated Musharraf's Provisional Constitution, for as long as
the Constitution is suspended; the ruling did not validate Musharraf's
actions as legal under the Constitution.23 As a result, Musharraf risks
persecution at the whim of any future Pakistani government should it
deem his suspension of the Constitution to be illegal.24 In fact, "nothing
binds [a subsequent government] to respectful behaviour towards the
military men who deviated from the Constitution. 25 The Provisional
Constitution further mandates that no Court may question the Order that
produced the Provisional Constitution or render any "judgment, decree,
writ, order[,] or process whatsoever" against the Chief Executive.26 The
Supreme Court's order to convert Pakistan to a democracy by October
2002 endured as unenforceable decree, although Musharraf himself had
largely pledged to obey the order.27
Perhaps sensing the need for additional time, the General has
asserted that he wants "'to restore real democracy, the essence of
democracy, and not sham democracy for privileged people."' 28  In
attempts to restore real democracy, Musharraf outlined an agenda that
stressed seven major initiatives: rebuilding national confidence and
morale; removing inter-provincial disharmony and restoring national
cohesion; reviving the economy and restoring investors' confidence;
ensuring law, order, and speedy justice; strengthening and de-politicizing
state institutions; devolving more power to the grassroots level; and
imposing across-the-board accountability. 29  In addition, Musharraf
placed high priority on eradicating corruption and "punishing those
21. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
22. See High Court, supra note 12.
23. See M.B. Naqvi, Options for Musharraf Defence Journal, at
http://www.defencejournal.com/globe/2000/sep/options.htm. (emphasis added)(last
visited Oct. 26, 2001).
24. See id.
25. Id
26. Provisional Constitution, supra note 16.
27. Naqvi, supra note 23.
28. See Asian Political News, Musharraf Gives District Governments to Pakistan, at
http://www.findarticles.com/c f_0/mOWDQ/2000_August_21/64528204/p 1/article.jhtml?t
erm=Musharraf (August 21, 2000).
29. See South Asia Monitor, Pakistan: Musharraf's First Hundred Days, at
http://www.csis.org/saprog/saml9.html (March 1, 2000).
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responsible for plundering state banks., 30
Further, the General also declared 2000 the Year of Human Rights
in Pakistan, and singled out the practice of "honor killings," the
traditional method for dealing with so-called irreverent behavior of
female family members that purportedly brings dishonor to the men of
her respective family.31 Using strong language, Musharraf made clear
that the new government "'vigorously condemned the practice
of.. .honor killings"' and that "'killing in the name of honor is murder,
and it will be treated as such.'
' 32
Despite democratic assurances such as these, Musharraf's
administration has not yet come full circle from a dictatorial takeover to
a representative democracy, especially in terms of human rights. During
the summer of 2001, a highly publicized case involving a twenty-one
year old woman, whose husband doused her with acid, caught the
attention of human rights activists. 33  The woman, disfigured by her
husband's intentional abuse, sought to travel to Italy to undergo plastic
surgery to repair the scarring. 34  Musharraf's government refused to
allow her to leave the country to receive the much-needed medical
treatment, citing concern over Pakistan's image should word spread
throughout the world of this horrific incident.35 The incident had come
on the heels of accusations that Pakistan had fostered an environment of
widespread mistreatment of women,36 and statistics that revealed, as of
1998, only twenty-nine percent of women were literate, as opposed to
over fifty-five percent of men.
37
On the other hand, Musharraf has made several significant strides
with respect to the plight of Pakistani women, and appointed a prominent
female social worker to serve as Director of Education, Science, and
Technology. 38 In addition, he passed human rights legislation designed
to allow the arrest of any perpetrators of honor killings.39 Such laudable
30. High Court, supra note 12.
31. See Rachel A. Ruane, Murder in the Name of Honor: Violence Against Women
in Jordan and Pakistan, 14 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 1523 (2000).
32. Id at 1548.
33. Asian Political News, Author Says Pakistan Bars Acid-Burned Woman from
Treatment, at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOWDQ/200 1 June- 18/75831473/pI /article.j html?ter
mMusharraf (June 18, 200 l)[hereinafter "Pakistan Bars"].
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
38. See CNN, Musharraf Won't Set Timetable to Restore Democracy in Pakistan, at
http://europe.cnn.com/ASIANOW/south/9911/04/pakistan.musharraf/ (November 5,
1999).
39. Ruane, supra note 31 at 1548.
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attempts to cure Pakistan's societal ills are encouraging as Musharraf
continues to stress his intent to comply with the Supreme Court's
mandate for democracy and improve Pakistan's image throughout the
world.
Image, however, may be the least of Musharraf's worries. Having
dismissed Parliament, Musharraf's critical dilemma quickly became how
to meet the Supreme Court's October 2002 deadline of creating
democratic processes, and yet avoid the chance that the new Parliament
would summarily reinstate the Constitution and sentence him and his
supporters to prison.40 Of interest to Musharraf is the sobering fact that
no Pakistani president (a position to which he later appointed himself in
June 2001) has ever turned over power "ceremoniously., 4 1 According to
the South Asia Monitor:
In the past, Pakistan's military governments have promised-and have
initially delivered-more orderly governance and improved
administration. Generals operate efficiently within the strongly
hierarchical structure of the military; however, the same qualities that
make them strong military commanders can make them weak civil
administrators. They are used to giving orders. They are not used to
handling different and disagreeing points of view, much less the
rough and tumble of open politics.
In fact, Musharraf barely escaped certain death on April 26, 2001,
when a car bomb failed to detonate as his motorcade sped past a rigged
vehicle.43 Pakistani officials arrested a member of the Pakistan Rangers,
the nation's civil armed forces, and two others in connection with the
failed assassination plot.44  While Musharraf may boast that "I'm a
soldier, frankly, I believe in destiny, and I'm not afraid[,]" 45 a close
friend volunteered that "[h]e should be scared -- he is scared., 46
III. March Towards Democracy or the Making of a Dictatorial Regime?
Widespread constituent support is most often linked to the
40. Naqvi, supra note 23.
41. See Asian Political News, Musharraf Takes Oath as Pakistani President, at
http://www.findartices.com/cf 0/mOWDQ/200 1 June 2 3/76 14 3 5 7 3 /p /article.jhtml?ter
m=Musharraf (June 23, 2001)[hereinafter 'Musharraf Takes Oath].
42. South Asia Monitor, supra note 29.
43. CNN, Man Charged in Musharraf Assassination Plot, at
http://,ww.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/09/pakistan.plot/index.html (July 9,
2002). Allegedly, the van used in the assassination attempt was retrieved and may have
been used in the bombing outside the United States Consulate in Karachi on June 14,
2002. Id.
44. Id.
45. Transcript of Interview, supra note 1.
46. Spaeth, supra note 13.
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perception, rather than the reality, of an administration's successes.
Foiled suicide plots and ubiquitous protests by Islamic militants often
garner all the attention, yet Musharraf continues, sometimes quietly, to
implement his plan to return plagued Pakistan to democratic rule. So
how has General Musharraf done, according to both foreign and
domestic observers, with respect to the lofty promises he made over three
years ago? According to the CIA, too little has changed despite good
intentions for improving the economy.
47
Earlier this year, Musharraf detained hundreds of activists
demanding democratic elections and the restoration of democracy, much
to the displeasure of those thirsty for signs of democratic safeguards.4a
Yet Musharraf has stood by what he believes to be the successes of his
government by asserting that the "plundering of national wealth" by
former administrations has been halted and the economy has recovered
nicely.49  Musharraf reminds cynics that he did, after all, inherit an
50astronomical debt of nearly forty billion dollars upon claiming power.
Despite the successes Musharraf references, some critics suggest
that when he appointed himself President in the summer of 2001, just
before his trip to India for negotiations regarding the on-going Kashmir
territorial dispute, Musharraf gave himself even greater clout, seemingly
pushing Pakistan further away from an increasingly elusive democracy."
But perhaps greater clout is precisely what Musharraf must wield in
order to install a democratic government. Critics balked once again
when Musharraf shuffled his National Security Council in an attempt to
seat a more permanent council, one that would last beyond the election
period next October, possibly in an effort to show a willingness to
comport with the Supreme Court deadline.52
47. See Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
48. See Asian Political News, Pakistan Detains Nearly 800 Activists, Seals May Day
Venue, at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOWDQ/200 _May_7/74265525/p 1/article.jhtml?term
=Musharraf (May 7, 2001).
49. Asian Political News, Foreign Forces Trying to Destabilize Pakistan:
Musharraf at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf 0/m0WDQ/2000 Oct 16/6 64 7 1943 /pl/article.jhtml?term
=Musharraf (Oct. 16, 2000).
50. See Asian Political News, India Prepares to Receive Pakistan 's Musharraf at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf 0/mOWDQ/200 1 July_ 16/77057925/p 1/article.jhtml?ter
m=Musharraf (July 16, 2001).
51. See Asian Political News, Musharraf Presidency Challenged in Pakistani Court,
at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf 0/mOWDQ/200 1 June_ 2 3/76 14 3609/p 1/article.jhtml?ter
m musharraf+presidency+challenged. See also Musharraf Takes Oath, supra note 39.
Pakistan has fought, and continues to fight, a long, bloody, religious and territorial war
over the Kashmir region held by largely Hindu India.
52. See Asian Political News, Musharraf Reconstitutes National Security Council, at
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By August of 2001, Musharraf had outlined his latest plan for
restoring democracy in the Islamic Republic.53 During the summer of
2001, his government held democratic elections for 102 district
governments. 54 Specifically, the regime replaced deputy commissioners,
holdovers of British rule who were often referred to as "'the king of the
district and fountain of all corruption,"' with democratically elected
administrators. 5' As for national and provincial elections, Musharraf
promised a three-phase electoral process, starting with the two houses of
Parliament, the Senate and National Assembly, and the four provincial
assemblies. 56 Soon after, elections for speakers and deputy speakers of
the assemblies would be held and national and provincial governments
would be created.
57
While Musharraf seemed to be embracing the call for democracy in
Pakistan, he had not wholeheartedly embraced the West and Western
values. Musharraf believes that Muslims are angry with the West
because, in part, of the morally bankrupt motion pictures released by
Hollywood.58 Further, Musharraf cites a "pattern of attacks" on Muslims
in various parts of the world, including Chechnya and Iraq.59 Musharraf
balances his words between democracy and dictatorship; Muslim
extremists and those seeking to eradicate terrorism; and iron-fisted
proclamations and compromise. As exemplified in his statements
regarding the West, Musharraf recognizes the frustration many Muslims
feel when they look at the western world, yet he seems to wish that their
myopic perspectives were coupled with his voiced disdain for terrorism.
Musharraf continued to press forward, and in April of 2002,
Pakistan's National Security Council and Federal Cabinet agreed to hold
a national referendum to extend Musharraf's presidency another five
60years. In effect, the October deadline set by the Supreme Court wouldonly remain in order to hold legislative elections. 61  Thus, the
http://www.findarticles.com/cf -/mOWDQ/200 1 July-9/76664488/p 1/article.jhtml?term
=Musharraf (July 9, 2001).
53. Asian Political News, Musharraf Announces Elections for Oct. 2002, at
http://www.findarticles.com/cf_0/mOWDQ/200 1 August 2 0/78 37 49 80 /p l/article.jhtml?t
erm Musharraf (August 20, 200 1)[hereinafter "'MusharrafAnnounces Elections ].
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. See also Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2 (outlining governmental
structure of Pakistan).
57. MusharrafAnnounces Elections, supra note 53.
58. Insight on the News, supra note 4.
59. Id
60. See CNN, Musharraf Poll Plan to be Unveiled, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/03/pakistan.referendum/index/htmi
(April 3, 2002)[hereinafter "Musharraf Poll Plan'].
61. ld.
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referendum, designed to solidify Musharraf's hold on power, would
reduce the October deadline to political jockeying for Musharraf, rather
than a fight for his political life.62 The referendum, in effect, would
frustrate the traditional method of electing Pakistan's president, whereby
voters elect the members of the two houses of parliament, who in turn
select the president.63 As such, Musharraf bypasses the legislature in his
bid to remain president via referendum, and prevents exiled Prime
Minister Benazir Bhutto, of the Pakistan's People's Party, from any
planned run for the presidency in October 2002.64 To further bury
Bhutto's political aspirations, Musharraf maintains that if Bhutto re-
enters the country, she will be arrested and face trial on the charges
pending against her.65
Not surprisingly, Musharraf faced significant opposition from his
referendum plan, largely from the ousted leaders, Bhutto and Sharif, and
their respective political parties, the Pakistan People's Party and the
Pakistan Muslim League,66 whose candidates were expected to dominate
the October elections.67 Musharraf attempted to quell the outrage by
reiterating his pledge to return Pakistan to democracy by the October
2002 deadline. 68 Further, he asserted that the referendum would create a
more stable political situation, ensure economic certainty, secure a
mandate for his reforms, and assist the war on terrorism.
69
The referendum asked:
"For the continuation of the local government system, restoration of
democracy, sustainability and continuation of reforms, elimination of
sectarianism and extremism[,] and completion of Quaid-I-Azam's
[refers to the founder of Pakistan] concept, do you want to elect
President General Pervez Musharraf for the next five years as
62. See id.
63. Id. See also CNN, Mass Rally for Musharraf at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/09/pakistan.campaign/index/html
(April 9, 2002)[hereinafter "Musharraf Rally "].
64. See Musharraf Poll Plan, supra note 60.
65. See Indiainfo.com, Musharraf Threatens Bhutto with Trial if She Returns, at
http://news.indiainfo.com/spotlight/mushabid/15bhutto.html (April 15, 2002).
66. CNN, Musharraf Plan to Bolster His Power, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/26/pakistan.presidency/index.html
(June 27, 2002)[hereinafter "'Bolster Power'].
67. See CNN, Endorsing Musharraf's Ambition, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/O4/28/pakistan.musharraf/index.html
(April 29, 2002)[hereinafter "Endorsing Ambition "].
68. MusharrafRally, supra note 63.
69. CNN, Musharraf Won't Quit Army Chief Role, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/16/pakistan.musharraf/index.html
(April 17, 2002). Yet, Musharraf also made clear that his run for President would not
result in his relinquishing his position as army chief Id.
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President of Pakistan?"' 70
Although the Constitution itself remained in abeyance, the Supreme
Court ruled that Musharraf's referendum was legal and constitutional.7 1
Opponents to the referendum cited last minute, pro-Musharraf procedural
alterations of rules governing who can vote and where votes can be cast,
including the addition of polling places in such locales as hospitals,
prisons, and gas stations.7 1 Musharraf increased the number of polling
stations, reduced the voting age, and softened the rules used to determine
voter eligibility.
73
Again no surprise, Musharraf sailed to victory, primarily due to a
higher-than-expected turnout and an earned, or perhaps arrogated, tally
of greater than ninety percent of all votes.74  Specifically, election
officials claim Musharraf captured 97.7% of the votes, and estimate a
voter turnout greater than fifty percent, much larger than the estimated
thirty-eight percent turnout for the parliamentary elections in 1997.75
Critics, however, have alleged voter fraud, have cited examples of
multiple voting by the same voter and the acceptance of flimsy voter
identification, and have excoriated Musharraf for using the "machinery
of the state" to ensure his victory.76 The independent Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan videotaped what the organization purports to be
people voting numerous times without showing identification.7 7 Other
critics claimed that stacks of ballots were summarily stamped as votes
for Musharraf.
78
Soon after victory, Musharraf again asserted his power by proposing
changes to the Constitution that would grant him more power after the
October elections. 79 One such grant consisted of an amendment that
70. CNN, Musharraf Cruising to Poll Triumph, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/30/pakistan.referendum/index.html
(May 1, 2002)[hereinafter "Cruising to Poll Triumph'].
71. CNN, Pakistan Top Court Backs Musharraf at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/27/pakisan.supreme/index.htm
(April 27, 2002).
72. Endorsing Ambition, supra note 67 (emphasis added). See also CNN, Musharraf
Pledges Fresh Terror Crackdown, at
http://wwv.cnn.coim/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/02/pakistan.mush.speech/index.htm
I (May 2, 2002)[hereinafter "Terror Crackdown'].
73. Endorsing Ambition, supra note 67.
74. See CNN, Musharraf Cruises to Victory, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/01/pakistan.referendum/index.html
(May 1, 2002).
75. Terror Crackdown, supra note 72.
76. See id. See also Cruising to Poll Triumph, supra note 70.
77. Terror Crackdown, supra note 72.
78. Id.
79. See Bolster Power, supra note 66.
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would permit the president to fire the elected prime minister and cabinet,
and personally appoint replacements . 0 The president would first need to
consult a nine-member National Security Council that the president
would chair.8 ' Musharraf invited the public to comment for one month
on the proposed changes, after which time the Federal Cabinet and
National Security Council considered the responses.
Additionally, Musharraf issued 'a decree that prohibits any person
who has held the office of prime minister of Pakistan, or chief minister of
a province, from seeking that office again, even if the full term had never
been served. 3 Such a limit conveniently disqualifies both Bhutto and
Sharif from running for Prime Minister in October 2002.84
In June 2002, Musharraf announced that he planned to permit the
National Security Council to dismiss elected Parliaments, a power
eliminated by his predecessor, Sharif, and that the president, ostensibly
Musharraf, would have the power to appoint the chiefs of the army and
85
navy.
Musharraf contends that a strong Security Council would prevent
abuses, avoid a hasty, irrational dismissal of Parliament,8 6 "ensure a
'unity of command,' and [foster] a more sustainable democracy for
[Pakistan]. 87 Opponents argue that a National Security Council would
usurp the power of Parliament, a body elected by the people.8 However,
these changes automatically became law without the approval of
Parliament, according to Musharraf, who insisted that the Supreme Court
had granted him authority to implement such changes immediately.
8 9
Additionally, Musharraf unveiled a five-year fiscal plan that outlined
proposed spending for projects such as dams and irrigation programs,
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. CNN, Musharraf Bars Predecessors from PM Role, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/07/musharraf.pm/index.html (July
7, 2002).
84. See id Pakistan's constitution does not include term limits for prime minister,
but does limit the terms of president to two. Id. Musharraf also mandated that all political
candidates hold a university degree. CNN, Opposition Slams Musharraf Changes, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/08/pakistan.decrees/indcx.html
(July 8, 2002).
85. See Bolster Power, supra note 66.
86. CNN, Musharraf" 'Dozen' U.S. Troops in Pakistan, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/12/pakistan.musharraf/index.html
(July 13, 2002)[hereinafter "Dozen Troops'].
87. See Bolster Power, supra note 66.
88. CNN, Musharraf Consolidates Hold on Power, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/08/2 1/pakistan.constitution/index.html
(August 22, 2002)[hereinafter "Musharraf Consolidates"].
89. ld
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efforts at eradicating poverty, and improving education.90 Musharraf
decreed that "'[t]here needs to be a constant during this transition from
military to democratic rule."' 91
By August 2002, reports surfaced that Musharraf had claimed he
recanted his proposal that would allow the president to dismiss the prime
minister and appoint a replacement, but analysts determined that he
could still achieve the same effect by dissolving the entire Parliament via
the National Security Council.92
Despite Musharraf s political maneuvering during the summer of
2002, elections were, in fact, held in October 2002, as mandated by the
Supreme Court. According to some, Musharraf's plan may have
backfired.93 By preventing Bhutto and Sharif from returning to Pakistan
to enter the race for Prime Minister, a religious coalition party won a
sizable forty-five of the 342 seats, having never before won more than
five, and gained control of two of four provinces. 94 Musharraf's party
wrestled only 118 seats, 54 seats fewer than required for a majority. 95
Factors other than Musharrafs maneuvers contributed to the religious
coalition's large (by historical standards) victory; for example, the
terrorist influence in the two provinces that the party won, both of which
border Afghanistan and may harbor members or supporters of al Qaeda
or the dissolved Taliban.
96
Notwithstanding the disappointing outcome, a saving grace for
Musharraf is the diverse nature of the religious coalition party; not all of
its elected officials are radicals.97 In fact, some are Islamic moderates,
who unlikely will choose to upset the delicate power balance in Pakistan
by causing a religious uprising. 98 Soon after the October elections, in
which no party won enough seats to be dubbed the majority, the
Parliament concentrated on the task of appointing a Prime Minister and
selected Mir Zafarullah Jamali, former chief minister of Baluchistan
province and a pro-government party member, for the much sought-after
90. Dozen Troops, supra note 86.
91. Musharraf Consolidates, supra note 87.
92. See id. See also CNN, Musharraf Promises 'Clean' Elections, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/09/musharraf.election/index.html
(October 10, 2002).
93. The Washington Times, Musharraf and the Mullahs, at
http://www.washtimes.com/op-ed/20021021-24150264.htm (October 21, 2002).
94. Id.
95. CNN, Musharraf to 'Hand Over Power' Imminently, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/I 1/20/musharraf.speech/index.html
(November 20, 2002).
96. See The Washington Times, supra note 93.
97. See id
98. Id.
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position. 99
V. Immediate Post-September 11th Events: Musharraf is Pressed into
Service.
After the terrorist attacks in the United States on September 11,
2001, Musharraf needed to move quickly and strategically in order to
pledge support to the United States and still maintain order within
Pakistan's largely Muslim, and often anti-United States, population. In
his address to the nation on September 19, 2001, he pledged intelligence,
use of air space, and logistical support to the United States. 00 He began
by alerting his constituents to the fact that the United States had the
support of the United Nations Security Council.'' Moreover, Musharraf
warned that the United Nations passed a resolution that supported
punishment for those committing terrorism and those harboring
terrorists. 102 Recognizing the gravity of the situation and the critical role
that the United States had asked Pakistan to play, Musharraf further
warned that the wrong decision could lead to the harm of Pakistan's
"critical concerns,' 0 3 such as its sovereignty, economy, strategic assets
(specifically, nuclear weapons and missiles), and the Kashmir cause.'4
Musharraf strategically decreed that the decision must be reached
according to the teachings of Islam, as he is acutely aware of Pakistan's
devout Muslim population. 10 5  Keeping Pakistan's demographics in
mind, Musharraf clearly displayed to his people a concern and sympathy
for the Taliban, the since-toppled ruling party of Afghanistan prior to
September 11, 2001.1°6 Musharraf conveyed that he believed offering
support to the United States would best serve both Pakistan's and
Afghanistan's interests. 10 7 The General then customarily asked for the
peoples' trust, and for Allah to guide and protect them.
10 8
Evident from Musharraf's speech, given just eight days after the
99. CNN, Coalition Deal Hits Musharraf at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/1 1/05/pakistan.politics/index.html
(November 5, 2002).
100. DAWN, Highlights of General Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, at
http://www.dawn.com/events/speech/20010919/index.htm (September 19,
2001 )[hereinafter "Highlights 7.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. See id
105. See Highlights, supra note 100. See also Central Intelligence Agency, supra note
2 (listing Pakistan's Muslim population as ninety-seven percent of Pakistan's entire
population).
106. See id.
107. ld.
108. See id.
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terrorist attacks in the United States, was the need to balance Pakistan's
support for the international community, led by the United States, with
the Muslim values that dictate both the life of nearly every Pakistani and
the political decisions of Musharraf. Because Musharrafs government
inherently rests on unstable ground, and is technically unsupported by
the Constitution, without widespread popular support, Musharraf risks
being deposed, or worse, civil war.
Recently, Musharraf, in an address to the nation, proudly reiterated
Pakistan's decision to aid the international coalition against terrorism and
announced that "[b]y the grace of God Almighty our decision was
absolutely correct."' 10 9 However, he laments the fact that religious
extremist parties within Pakistan vehemently opposed the decision."0
Yet, in nearly the same breath, Musharraf commended the majority's
efforts at frustrating the demonstrations.' Once again, Musharraf was
seen engaging in a balancing act of gently condemning the opposition,
while focusing more on praising those who serve Pakistan's best interests
than on lambasting those constituents who, also in the name of Pakistan,
incite anti-American riots and demonstrations.
V. Pakistan's Relationship with the Now-Defunct Taliban
Evidence of Musharraf's balancing act was no more apparent that in
a recent interview, in which Musharraf conceded that Pakistan's
environment is not necessarily conducive to a parliamentary democracy,
but nonetheless asserted that the demands of the "whole world,
particularly the United States, and of our own people," make an attempt
at democracy "imperative." '" 2 Curiously, the General conveyed that he
does not believe that "anyone in Pakistan. . .thinks we shouldn't have
democracy."'" 3  As such, he believes that Pakistan has more than a
"sporting chance" of succeeding.'' 4
In light of the 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Musharraf
109. See Web Site of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, English Rendering of General
Pervez Musharraf's Address to the Nation, at
http://www.pak.gov.pk/public/Presidentaddress.htm (January 12, 2002)[hereinafter
"Address to the Nation'1. Musharraf expressed his "profound grief' in February 2002
over the execrable killing of Wall Street Journal journalist Daniel Pearl by suspected
terrorists. CNN, Musharraf" 'Profound Grief' Over Pearl's Death, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/02/21/musharraf.pearl/index.html
(February 21, 2002). He ordered the immediate apprehension of all involved in the
appalling crime. Id. Musharraf then reiterated his vow to combat terrorism together with
the international community. Id.
110. See Address to the Nation, supra note 109.
111. See id
112. See Insight on the News, supra note 4.
113. See id.
114. Id.
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took a diplomatic, yet staunchly pro-American position on what de
Borchgrave dubs "cultural vandalism" by the Taliban in Afghanistan." 15
However, the General clearly blamed the United States' abandonment of
Afghanistan, after the collaborative war to oust the Soviets, as the reason
why a government like the Taliban could rise to power."16 And yet,
Musharraf denounced the Taliban's actions as an "ignorant, primitive
interpretation of Islam that is condemned by the entire Islamic world."
' 17
Notwithstanding Musharraf s disapproval of the Taliban's actions,
he had attempted to support the Taliban insofar as was necessary to
protect Pakistan's national interest and security, especially with an on-
going war with India plaguing his nation." 8 Musharraf tends never to
sound too extreme, and thus when asked how to handle Osama bin
Laden, who the Taliban refused to forsake, Musharraf suggested a
compromise." 9 He proposed that an Islamic, three-judge panel be
created and that any trial be held in an Islamic country chosen by the
United States and Osama bin Laden.
120
A constant concern of Musharraf, evident in his positions and his
carefully chosen words, is the omnipresent possibility of dissention and
conflict within Pakistan. After September 11, 2001, protests exploded
throughout the country in opposition to the American strikes against
Afghanistan.' 2' In fact, thousands of Taliban supporters in Pakistan left
the country destined for Afghanistan to aid the Taliban against the
United States. 22 Considering the years of fighting with India over
Kashmir, Musharraf indicated the need to keep a peaceful environment
on its more stable western border.
123
With the Taliban now defunct, Musharraf has teamed up with the
new Afghan leader, Hamid Karzai, to "wipe out terrorism and terrorist
sanctuaries in their nations. ,124 The fledgling partnership appears solid
and Musharraf has provided Karzai with ten million dollars to help
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. Insight on the News, supra note 4.
i18. See id.
119. See id.
120. Jd.
121. CNN, 'Trained Terrorists' Behind Pakistan Church Slayings, at
http://www.cnn.cotm/200I/WORLD/asiapcf/south/l I0/28/pak.christian.shootinevindex/htm
1 (Oct. 28, 2001)[hereinafter "Trained Terrorists"].
122. CNN, U.S. Commander, Pakistan Leader Discuss Afghan Situation, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/10/29/ret.attacks.pakistan/index.html
(Oct. 29, 2001).
123. Insight on the News, supra note 4.
124. CNN, Karzai, Musharraf Pledge to Fight Terrorism, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/02/musharraf.kabul/index.html
(April 2, 2002).
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rebuild tattered Kabul and the rest of war-tom Afghanistan. 2 5 The best
indication of a long-lasting collaboration between the two countries is
evidenced by the leaders' propensity to refer to each other as
"brother."1
26
VI.Recent Developments with Archrival India
While the western border appears relatively pacific, it is Pakistan's
eastern border that certainly concerns Musharraf the most, although the
General continues to maintain a positive outlook. 127 After talks with
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in July 2001 yielded little in
the way of a concrete agreement, Musharraf declared: "'The hope I have
[now is that] I feel nobody can stop this (peace) process from moving
forward." ' 2 '8 The General added that he "'went to the summit with a
very sincere search for peace. [He] went to close the chapter of hostility,
mistrust, and suspicion. [He] went for peace.... ,,,29
Musharraf later theorized that India's stronghold in the Muslim-
majority Kashmir region is the only issue preventing "normalize[d]
relations" between India and Pakistan. 30 The General stressed that he
"'return[ed] empty handed but [is] not disappointed because there was
tremendous goodwill and.. .the resolve to carry forward [with]
the.. .process. ' ' ,"31 In keeping with his positive attitude toward the talks,
Musharraf added that "[w]e had substantial progress at Agra and we need
to pick up the threads from there."'
32
With both countries now equipped with nuclear weapons, which
each country boldly tested in 1998,133 Musharraf's positive attitude is a
welcome relief to an increasingly fragile international landscape.
Sanctions imposed by the United States, such as the United States'
steadfast refusal to deliver a group of F-16 fighters for which Pakistan
has already paid, persisted as punishment for the weapons tests
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. See CNN, Musharraf Says Peace Process Will Continue, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/2 1/agra.summit/index.html (July
21, 2001)[hereinafter "Peace Process'].
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. Approximately 33,000 people have died in twelve years of fighting over the
disputed Kashmir region. CNN, Musharraf to India: 'We want friendship,' at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/04/01/pakistan.india/index.html (April
1, 2002)[hereinafter "We Want Friendship'].
131. Peace Process, supra note 127.
132. Id.
133. See CNN, Pakistan Offers Nuclear Test Ban, at
http://www.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/1I / 10/gen.pakistan.mushoffer/index.ht
ml (Nov. 10, 2001).
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conducted just before Musharraf wrestled control from Prime Minister
Sharif.134 Musharraf warned that the refusal to deliver the fighters has
resonated negatively throughout Pakistan, resulting in increased anti-
American sentiment.
135
In anticipation of the upcoming meeting at Agra with Prime
Minister Vajpayee in July 2001, the General strategically appointed
himself president, a move that gave Musharraf increased power and birth
to many a furrowed brow.' 36 Had the appointment been made pursuant
to Pakistani's Constitution, the move largely would be considered
ceremonial because the president is somewhat of a mere figurehead
under the Constitution. 37  But, because the Constitution remained in
abeyance, and both the powerful Prime Minister position and Parliament
had been dissolved after the coup, Musharraf also decided to create a
new National Security Council as a substitute governing body for the
expelled Parliament. 138  The new Council afforded Musharraf more
power as President, much to the chagrin of those determined to hold
Musharraf to the Supreme Court order to return Pakistan to democracy
by October 2002.131 Immediately, the new President attempted to quell
those fears and asserted: "'The international community should
understand that the question here is not to return the country to
democracy, but [to establish] democracy in Pakistan."",140  Musharraf
insisted that the country continue to follow the path toward democracy,
but instructed that his self-promotion to president is indeed in Pakistan's
national interest. 14
1
Aside from the debacle that Musharraf caused with his self-
appointment to president just before his meeting with Pakistan's nuclear
foe India, Musharraf recently tempted his Indian enemies by stating that
Kashmir "runs in our blood" and that "we will never budge an inch from
134. CNN, Pakistani Leader 'Not At All Worried' About His Survival, at
http ://wwww.cnn.com/200 I /WORLD/asiapcf/south/1 1 / 1 /ret.musharraf. statement/index.
html (Nov. 11, 200 1)[hereinafter "Leader Not Worried'].
135. ld
136. See CNN, Musharraf Committed to Democracy, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/20/pakistan.musharraf/index.html
(June 20, 2001).
137. CNN, Pakistani President Expands His Powers, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/07/04/pak.musharraf/index.html
(July 4, 2001).
138. See id.
139. See id.
140. See CNN, Musharraf Rules Out Early Elections, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/29/pakistan.musharraf.elections/i
ndex.html (June 29, 2001)(emphasis added).
141. See id.
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our principle stand on Kashmir."'' 42 Musharraf is quick to condemn
terrorism of any kind and slyly reminded India of the words of their own
Prime Minister Vajpayee, who concluded that "mind-sets will have to be
changed and historical baggage will have to be jettisoned.' 43 Yet, in
nearly the same breath, Musharraf reminded India of Pakistanis'
willingness to "spill [their] last drop of blood" defending Pakistan. 144
Such iteration occurs almost daily, and often includes conflicting
statements from the same leader, perhaps a result of the enormous
consequence words can have when two nuclear powers are embroiled in
a contest of wills, historical and religious profundity, and international
viability. Neither side wishes to appear too terroristic or too placid.
With nearly one million troops now congregated on the "Line of
Control" in Kashmir, and three wars between each other since 1947 (two
of which were fought over Kashmir), the two sovereigns are engaged in a
constant, nearly consuming struggle, both physical and
communicative. 14' Historically, as soon as the world braces for potential
nuclear war between the two disputants, calmer minds prevail, and a
concession occurs.
Less than a month after India blamed Pakistan for a December 17,
2001 suicide attack on India's Parliament, Musharraf declared war on
extremism and terrorism.146 Musharraf s declaration was a nod to his old
foe, a nod indicating that his hands were neither hovering over the
nuclear trigger nor patting the backs of terrorists. Musharraf next banned
several of the most militant terrorist groups as a show of good faith.
147
"'Sincerely, we want friendship,"' offered Musharraf. 48  India,
unimpressed, demanded that Musharraf extradite over twenty suspected
terrorists to India, a demand Musharraf promised will remain
unfulfilled. 149  "'We have our law, we will try them here,"' stressed
Musharraf.' 50 Musharraf repeatedly has denied offering any type of aid
to suspected terrorists in the Kashmir region, but has admitted, readily
and often, that Pakistan gives "moral support" to Kashmir inhabitants
fighting a "freedom struggle" against India. '51 This claim no doubt
142. See Address to the Nation, supra note 109.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See CNN, Musharraf" Next Move Up to India, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/0ll 9/gen.musharraf.tensions/index.ht
ml (January 19, 2002).
146. See id.
147. We Want Friendship, supra note 130.
148. Id.
149. See id.
150. Id.
151. CNN, Musharraf Tries to Quell Nuclear War Fears, at
http://www.cnn.comi/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/O1/pakistan.india/index/html (June
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enrages an India that hears, in one instance, about Pakistan's war on
extremism, and in the next instance, about moral support provided to
suspected terrorists in Kashmir.
In May 2002, the contest escalated again shortly after an Indian
army camp lost thirty people in an attack within Kashmir.152 Days later,
Musharraf asserted that his "'entire nation is with the armed forces and
will shed the last drop of their blood but will not allow any harm to come
to [Pakistan].' ' 53 Yet, he also conceded that Pakistan would not initiate
a war with India unless Pakistan's honor and dignity is threatened.
54
This type of political doublespeak, riddled with contradictions and
conditions, has become the accepted method of communication between
the two in their clash for control over Kashmir.
By the middle of 2002, India boasted of its pledge not to be the first
to strike with nuclear weapons, yet Pakistan may have fallen short of
making such a pledge by attaching conditions. 55 Musharraf contended
that Pakistan has gone even further than pledging a "no first strike"
plan. 56 According to Musharraf, Pakistan has called for a "no war pact"
with India and has proposed the denuclearization of South Asia and a
reduction of forces, a pact India has rejected. 57
VII. The View from the United States
Despite these apparent "no first strike" and "no war pact" proposals,
war still rests not only on the forefront of the minds of Indians and
Pakistanis, but on the Western mind as well. Tellingly, the United
Nations ordered the evacuation of the families of its staff in both
Pakistan and India in May 2002 after three separate grenade attacks by
ostensibly Islamic militants in Kashmir.158 The United Nations' order
came after the United States' State Department advised its sixty thousand
citizens in India to leave the area, and stated that "'the risk of intensified
military hostilities between India and Pakistan cannot be ruled out."
59
As for Musharraf's political shuffling, the United States viewed
Musharraf's self-appointment to the presidency in June 2001 as a step
1, 2002)[hereinafter "Nuclear War Fears '..
152. CNN, Restraint Urged After Musharraf Speech, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/05/27/india.pakistan/index.html (May
27, 2002).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. See also Nuclear War Fears, supra note 151. Musharraf announced that "'the
avoidance of war cannot come at the cost of compromising our honor and dignity."'
156. Nuclear War Fears, supra note 151.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
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away from democracy, rather than one that will foster advancement
toward democracy. 60 In fact, the United States' State Department went
so far as to assert that the General's ascension to the presidency
"'severely undermine[d] Pakistan's constitutional order and casts
Pakistan as a country ruled by decree rather than by democratic
process."",16 1  Yet, the White House largely has acquiesced to
Musharraf's power moves, including his April 2002 referendum, which
assured that his militaristic dictatorship would survive the mandated
October 2002 elections, disturbing critics who have urged that the United
States demand a no-detour march to democracy.
62
On the other hand, India formally congratulated Musharraf on his
promotion and Indian officials trivially mentioned that it solved the
problem of how to address a visiting chief executive, rather than a
"President" or "Prime Minister."' 163 Pakistani Foreign Minister Jaswant
Sattar even suggested that the world judge the leaders of Pakistan on
their performance, rather than on other, superficial factors. 164 Musharraf
reassured the world that "'[t]he supreme court order, supreme court
judgment, of holding elections in October 2002 is very clear.. .We will
abide by that.""
65
What must be most vexing for Musharraf is that to which Sattar
eluded: his track record. While Musharraf may have suspended the
Constitution, a move that no doubt looks bad to a western world heavily
bent on all countries moving speedily toward democracy, his government
has not even shown a "whiff of corruption."'166  At the very least,
Musharraf has made substantial economic advances for Pakistan, with
2001 on target to have a fiscal deficit below six percent of gross
domestic product, a percentage that is the lowest in eighteen years. 67
Saddled with nearly forty billion dollars of foreign debt, Pakistanis
160. See CNN, U.S. Condemns Pakistan Presidency Move, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/200 l/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/20/pakistan.usa/index.html (June
20, 2001 )[hereinafter "U.S. Condemns'].
161. Id.
162. CNN, Musharraf" India Stockpiling Weapons, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/09/12/pakistan.india/index.html
(September 12, 2002).
163. See CNN, Commonwealth Dismay at Musharraf Presidency, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/22/pakistan.president/index.html
(June 22, 2001).
164. U.S. Condemns, supra note 160.
165. CNN, Criticism Mounts for Musharraf at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/21/pakistan.pres.reax/index.html
(June 21, 2000).
166. See CNN, Musharraf's Economic Turnaround, at
http://wwww.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/20/pakistan.economy/index.html
(June 20, 200 I)[hereinafter "Economic Turnaround'].
167. Id.
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have a near-tangible memory of the corrupt and inefficient governments
of Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif.'68 According to
Musharraf, "'Pakistan faced serious setbacks in every sector due to
blunders made by previous leaders,"' referring to Bhutto and Sharif, who
he claims "'faned the politics of hatred and indulged in political
vendetta' while at the helm. 169 Yet, many Pakistanis fear, perhaps
without justification, that a march to democracy may precipitate a return
to economic disorder. 1
70
VIII. Musharraf's Role in the Ongoing War Against Terrorism.
As of April 2003, the global hunt for Osama bin Laden continues,
with the realization that bin Laden has proven elusive and may have
slipped into Pakistan from Afghanistan. Musharraf, coping with his
newfound notoriety as a staunch American ally in the new war, now
must consider the possibility that bin Laden and his minions are
treasuring refuge in western Pakistan. While Musharraf has shown every
indication of his commitment to assist, as necessary, in tracking down
bin Laden, the United States is far too aware of the opposition that
Musharraf is likely to face from his constituents if the war should move
into Pakistan. 7 General Franks asserts his confidence that the General
is committed to the task, and to the United States.
Notwithstanding his concern over the war in Afghanistan and its
potential repercussions, Musharraf remains confident in regard to his
leadership and popularity among Pakistanis, and claims that he is "not at
all worried" about anti-American and pro-Taliban protests that many
believe could lead to his downfall. 172 In fact, General Tommy Franks,
Chief of United States Central Command in the war against terrorism,
having met Musharraf personally, praised Musharraf as "a good man and
a good leader for his people."' 73 Yet an astute Aaron Brown, CNN
anchor of NewsNight, posed what might be the most appropriate question
of all: if bin Laden is indeed in Pakistan, will Pakistan permit the United
States to retrieve him? 174 All indications are that the answer is yes, so
long as Musharraf fulfills his promise. However, if Musharraf should
refute the data depicting bin Laden in Pakistan, or outright refuse entry
into Pakistan by the allied forces, then Brown's question becomes all the
more important.
168. Id.
169. Indiainfo.com, supra note 65.
170. See Economic Turnaround, supra note 166.
171. See Trained Terrorists, supra note 121.
172. Leader Not Worried, supra note 134.
173. NewsNight with Aaron Brown (CNN broadcast, Jan. 11, 2001).
174. Id.
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IX. The Role of the United Nations.
Should Musharraf suddenly become uncooperative in the hunt for
bin Laden, many will look to the United Nations to issue a strong
message to Musharraf and to Pakistan. First, according to the Charter of
the United Nations, one of the purposes of the United Nation's is to
"maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take
effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to
peace... ,,175 Second, the Charter further confers a self-defense power
upon any country that is attacked by way of decree that states: "Nothing
in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the
United Nations. .. ,,176 Third, the Charter provides that Members must
"make available... armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including
rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international
peace and security."' 177 These three clauses provide the United Nations,
including the United States, with what appears to be the necessary
authority to retrieve bin Laden within the borders of Pakistan.
Even more empowering for the United Nations, however, is a fourth
provision that allows for it to "enjoy in the territory of each of its
Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its
functions and the fulfillment of its purposes.' 78  Further,
"representatives of the Members of the United Nations... shall similarly
enjoy, [in the territory of each of its Members,] such privileges and
immunities as are necessary for the independent exercise of their
functions in connection with the Organization.' ' 179 Certainly, Musharraf,
as President of a member-state of the United Nations,180 must comply,
according to these provisions of the Charter, with any attempt by the
United Nations to retrieve Osama bin Laden.' 8
Perhaps most importantly, Musharraf must contend with the same
United Nations' resolution passed shortly after the attacks on the United
States, which calls for global cooperation and deems any country that
harbors a terrorist as one that fosters terrorism.182 The resolution sends a
175. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 1.
176. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
177. U.N. CHARTER art. 43, para. 1.
178. U.N. CHARTER art. 104.
179. U.N. CHARTER art. 105.
180. Pakistan became a Member of the United Nations on September 30, 1947. See
United Nations, Member States, at http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.htm (last
visited Dec. 16, 2001).
181. Pakistan accepts compulsory ICJ jurisdiction, but does so with reservations. See
Central Intelligence Agency, supra note 2.
182. G.A. Res., U.N. GAOR, 5 6th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/1 (Sep. 18, 2001). The
Resolution adopted by the General Assembly, entitled Condemnation of Terrorist Attacks
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clear message to leaders, such as Musharraf, who have, in some
instances, nurtured relationships with extremist governments, such as the
Taliban, instead of renouncing them. The resolution also serves as a
clear sign to Musharraf that mere acquiescence is forbidden, and that he
must actively ascertain whether terrorist cells do exist within the borders
of Pakistan.
Musharraf continues to insist that he doubts bin Laden has crossed
the border into Pakistan. 183 In fact, as of April 2003, the United States
still does not know the whereabouts of the world's most wanted terrorist.
This uncertainty places Musharraf in the unenviable position of having to
disprove what may, in fact, be a negative; that is, that bin Laden
continues to hole up in Afghanistan or elsewhere and has not
transformed an unwitting Pakistan into a harborer of terrorists.
With full United Nations backing, the operation to eliminate
organized terrorist cells could become quite a headache for Musharraf.
Musharraf has indicated his reluctance to fight a two-front war; the
sooner bin Laden is captured, the sooner Musharraf can redouble his
efforts on Pakistan's Kashmir (eastern) border with India. Musharraf's
preference for singleness of purpose may well have been the trait that
drove him to maintain a relationship with the Taliban when no other
country would recognize the brutal leaders. 184 With the Taliban having
been recently toppled, Musharraf must decide whether to use his own
troops to continue to search for bin Laden within Pakistan, and
contemplate the role he may be compelled to play as the hunt for bin
Laden escalates.
in the United States of America, provides:
The General Assembly,
Guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,
1. Strongly condemns the heinous acts of terrorism, which have caused
enormous loss of human life, destruction and damage in the cities of New
York, host city of the United Nations, and Washington, D.C., and in
Pennsylvania;
2. Expresses its condolences and solidarity with the people and Government of
the United States of America in these sad and tragic circumstances;
3. Urgently calls for international cooperation to bring to justice the
perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of the outrages of 11 September 2001;
4. Also urgently calls for international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts
of terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for aiding, supporting or
harbouring the perpetrators, organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held
accountable.
Id. Musharraf recently requested payback for his role in the United States' new war.
Specifically, the General asked that the United States play an "active role" in fostering
peace in the Kashmir dispute and monitoring Indian terrorism and human rights
violations. See Address to the Nation, supra note 109.
183. See News at Ten (WB broadcast, Jan. 18, 2002).
184. See Insight on the News, supra note 4.
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X. Conclusion
What has become clear regarding the war against terrorism is the
relief that undoubtedly awaits Musharraf upon the news of bin Laden's
death or capture. In what may amount to wishful thinking, Musharraf
recently has been quoted suggesting that bin Laden may already be
dead.' 85  Even though Musharraf undoubtedly has heightened his
credibility and the legitimacy of his administration in the eyes of the
western world by assisting the United States, the global search for
terrorists and the threat of force against those countries that harbor
terrorists, likely has caused Musharraf significant stress as well. There is
no way to know whether bin Laden truly may be within Pakistan, a
suggestion that must strike fear within Musharraf. Continued tensions in
the Kashmir region have sapped Pakistan's resources enough,
notwithstanding the efforts of Pakistan in attempting to seal up the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border from fleeing Afghan refugees.
Even considering these challenges, Musharraf essentially has
fulfilled his promise to transform Pakistan into a democracy by October
2002. Musharraf is not necessarily faced with a choice between the two
extremes; that is, of resigning as President and Chief Executive, which
would be hailed as democratic, and continuing to trot toward democracy
with a tight grasp on the reigns, viewed by many as dictatorial. Rather,
the more efficient outcome, and the one that occurred in October 2002,
would see Musharraf as President within the new democratic government
in order to achieve the smoothest transition.
With no confirmed corruption witnessed to this point in his
administration, Musharraf at least deserves high marks for cleaning up
after Sharif and Bhutto's heavily corrupt administrations. In fact,
Musharraf only accepts the salary he earned as army chief before the
coup, and still nobly insists on using commercial flights for foreign
trips.186 Further, Musharraf has proven to be the most rare, yet often
most effective, of breeds: a benevolent dictator; especially rare in the
sense that he arrived in power after a lengthy and storied military career.
All things considered, the world could be saddled with a much more
frightful proposition than to have a leader such as Musharraf as President
and Chief Executive of turbulent Pakistan. Whether Musharraf converts
the Republic into a democracy by any superficially mandated deadline
should not be the focus of those concerned with Pakistan's future.
Rather, emphasis should be placed on whether Musharraf is advancing
185. See CNN, Karzai, Musharraf Pledge to Fight Terrorism, at
http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/central/04/02/musharraf.kabul/index.htm
(April 2, 2002).
186. Spaeth, supra note 13.
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the Muslim state towards democracy in a manner that will allow the yet
unborn democratic government to govern successfully. Almost the
entirety of the evidence indicates that Musharraf is accomplishing just
that.
For its part, the United States, and other concerned countries, ought
to work closely with Musharraf in developing the necessary requisites in
order to continue to assist the transformation of a politically unstable
country into one with a solid foundation upon which a long-lasting and
successful democracy might rest. Part of the United States' agenda
should include, however, a closer look at Musharraf's efforts, some of
which are lacking, at curing the ritualistic and traditional societal ills,
such as violence and subjugation of women, despite what appear to be
administration successes at wiping out governmental corruption.
Having risen to the occasion in the war against terrorism, despite
vociferous domestic opposition from religious extremists, Musharraf at
least deserves every opportunity to accomplish, even if via oft-dictatorial
means, the praiseworthy goals he has outlined. This rings especially true
considering his leadership of a country that will play an ever-increasing
role in global affairs as the war against terrorism likely continues
throughout this decade. Finally, Musharraf exhibits the rarely seen
intrepidity to challenge the Islamic world to escape their morbid reality:
"' Today we are the poorest, the most illiterate, the most backward, the
most unhealthy, the most un-enlightened, the most deprived, and the
weakest of all the human race. ""87 These sentiments, if spoken by a
Westerner, would border on the epithetical. Yet spoken by Musharraf,
this mindset instills confidence in a frail and shaken international
community that craves a level-headed leader such as Musharraf, angry at
the plight of his people and perhaps destined to instill democracy, in one
of the most tumultuous regions of the world.
187. BBC News, Musharraf Berates Muslim World, at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/southasia/i 824455.stm (February 16, 2002).
Musharraf made these weighty comments in an address to a science and technology
conference attended by ministers of Muslim countries. "[T]he time ha[s] come,"
instructed Musharraf, "for Islamic nations to take part in collective self-criticism" or
"always be perceived as backward, illiterate - those who only indulge in extremism and
violence." Id.
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